zlb
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Post by zlb on Sept 14, 2019 22:38:02 GMT
mrclondon, thank you, the viewpoint on moral and ethical behaviours is helpful. If I remember some of the awful people I've worked with, and transfer them to this scenario, I have a much clearer understanding. "A platform rep simply can't square the circle between how lenders expect the platform to operate, and how the platform has to operate in the shady world of sub-prime loans." Doesn't this imply that the platforms are also required to have a certain roughness about them in order to operate with sub prime loans? As an aside, I wonder what happened to that notion that p2p was supposed to anarchically side step the banks, which would eventually attract good borrowers.
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Godanubis
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Anubis is known as the god of death and is the oldest and most popular of ancient Egyptian deities.
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Post by Godanubis on Sept 14, 2019 23:26:07 GMT
Having read this depressing account of the scrofulus bunch we have been exposed to, I feel a slush fund to facilitate bounty hunters with pliers and blowtorches is the way forward,if only to discourage other opportunists. Easier to use FBI approach advertise free luxury cruise for all those providing evidence of association with Lendy then grab them when they can’t resist turning up to collect.
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Post by samford71 on Sept 15, 2019 9:47:52 GMT
.... As an aside, I wonder what happened to that notion that p2p was supposed to anarchically side step the banks, which would eventually attract good borrowers. That is a myth propagated by P2P platforms. In P2P, the platform intermediates between a borrower and a lender. No money is created; the money is transferred and an asset (for the lender) and a liability (for the borrower) are created.
In commercial banking, there is no intermediation. The bank creates 'inside' money ab initio during loan formation (97% of the money in the economy stems from this loan formation). An asset is created for the bank, a liability for the borrower. The money is then deposited into the borrower's account who then withdraws it. Banks then hold prudential capital reserves against this position. These capital adequacy requirements are a function of how risky the loan or security is considered to be (to protect against default losses). Hence a government bond has a RWA (risk weighted asset) factor of 0; no capital is held against it. An good quality SME loan has 125% RWA factor so 125% of the Bank Tier 1 capital ratio of 10%, so 12.5% of the loan value is held against it. A residential mortgage is 50% RWA, so around 5% of the loan value is held against it.
These regulatory requirements have made it less economic to lend to risky counterparties. Banks are better off lending to higher quality counterparties are a lower rate in a more leveraged fashion. In particular, government bonds are very attractive to banks. Moreover, the asset management industry also became more risk averse, post 2008, in terms of what forms of fixed income credit product it would invest in. So the amount of direct lending coming from this source, into areas such as SME, bridging and development loans reduced. So good borrowers are perfectly well served by banks and other funding sources. In fact vs. pre 2008, they are better served. Conversely riskier borrowers are less well served. This is what the people wanted, so government and regulators delivered it in the time honoured fashion of closing the stable gate after the horse had bolted.
Honestly, why would any good borrower go to a P2P platform? I can borrow money at 1% secured by a portfolio of securities via margin lending. I can get a 3-year fixed rate mortgage at sub 1.5%. I can borrow unsecured for 5-years from a high street bank at 2.5% with a press of a button. Why would I pay RS 7%, FC 10%+, or a Lendy clone 20%+.
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r00lish67
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Post by r00lish67 on Sept 15, 2019 10:36:35 GMT
Honestly, why would any good borrower go to a P2P platform? I can borrow money at 1% secured by a portfolio of securities via margin lending. I can get a 3-year fixed rate mortgage at sub 1.5%. I can borrow unsecured for 5-years from a high street bank at 2.5% with a press of a button. Why would I pay RS 7%, FC 10%+, or a Lendy clone 20%+.
As ever, an interesting read, thanks. This snippet is the bit that concerns me. Even aside from the outer fringes of P2P rates e.g. FS/Lendy/Ablrate, are there sufficient 'good' borrowers to provide good risk-adjusted returns to investors at platforms like: Ratesetter (circa 6.5%) Funding Circle (circa 9.5%) Lending Works (circa 13%). Obviously they're not all exactly alike, but where do you draw the line? I'm beginning to form the opinion that the higher the average borrower rate, the lower the risk-adjusted return i.e. although theoretically you can suffer more bad debt and still maintain a good average rate with diversification of high rate loans, in practice the number of very sub-prime borrowers seems to increase exponentially as the average rate increases. So paradoxically the best rates/safest platforms might just be the ones with the most boring rates. Landbay, anyone?
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Post by dan1 on Sept 15, 2019 11:12:14 GMT
... Honestly, why would any good borrower go to a P2P platform? I can borrow money at 1% secured by a portfolio of securities via margin lending. I can get a 3-year fixed rate mortgage at sub 1.5%. I can borrow unsecured for 5-years from a high street bank at 2.5% with a press of a button. Why would I pay RS 7%, FC 10%+, or a Lendy clone 20%+.
I don't doubt what you post but I think there are some edge cases, although not sufficient to base the entire P2P industry on! Examples would be when speed is paramount, not being able to remortgage for 6 months due to CML rules hence 2nd charge, P2P-auction deals for bidders, and I'm sure there are others.
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Post by samford71 on Sept 15, 2019 11:55:37 GMT
r00lish67. I'm not sure where the seet spot is. In most asset classes, the best risk-adjusted returns occur toward the lower end of the return scale; as risk rises eventually the return flattens out and you are taking more risk for no marginal return. The problem, is that at the lower end of the risk scale, the outright return often isn't very attractive. The way to solve that is to leverage the returns of those lower risk assets. This is what banks do. The problem is that leverage makes you path dependent on the asset price vs funding. So it's not a free lunch. dan1. You're absolutely correct that there are edge cases. This, however, is exactly what we see in practice with most platforms. They launch with a limited number of good loans at high rates, originating from exactly the edge cases you are pointing out. It's when the platform tries to scale that up that the problems arise. There aren't enough good borrowers with specific reasons why they can't access conventional, cheaper finance. This was most obvious with the biggest platform of them all, LendingClub in the US. As they went towards their IPO, they tried to scale up their lending to enhance the share price and borrower quality collapsed. FC did exactly the same 'dash for trash' in the run up to their IPO. And with Lendy it wasn't the boat loans that caused the losses ...
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Post by samford71 on Sept 15, 2019 12:02:26 GMT
At the risk of repeating what mrclondon has said and what some of us have been saying ad nauseum for the last five years ...
LTVs (for bridge loans say) or LGDVs (for development loans) are forecasts based on assumptions. Those assumptions must still be valid for the forecast to be valid.Take a really simple example. Residential development of a piece of land. Projected value to be worth £10mm, based upon current market conditions. Profit for developer is assumed to be 20% given current benign economic environment. Build costs are projected to be £6mm based on labour, material costs and time factors. So by the residual method, the land value is £(10/1.2-6.0)=£2.33mm. A loan of £1.63mm, at 70% LTV, is extended against land.
A year later, it's take much longer than expected to get the project going and the borrrower defaults on loan. Market is softer by 5%. Less benign economic conditions mean developers are more risk averse, so require 25% profit margin. Development will take longer than expected driving up costs by 5%, to £6.3m. By residual method, land value is £(9.5/1.25-6.3)= £0.91mm. LTV of loan is now 179%. Recovery value at that level, pre-costs, would be 55%.
Was the RICs valuation wrong? No, it was correct, given the assumptions. The assumptions have changed and so has the value. Note how sensitive the LTV is to those assumptions: a 5% tweak to each factor moves the LTV from 70% to 179%, a factor of 2.56. It should be obvious that it's incredibly easy for a loan valued at 70% LTV to end up recovering well below par. Note that the example doesn't even include the negative impact of the borrower defaulting. RICs valuations assume non-default scenarios. As lenders we typically care about the recovery in a default scenario. That's a very big difference in assumption. In reality, such a default could easily result in an even more suppressed recovery given it coud be a firesale. The RICs valuation may simply be quite useless in the scenario lenders care about.
Historical data for recoveries, as collected by agencies such as Moody's and S&P, on non-bank senior secured loans (sub 70% LTV) imply an average recovery of around 65-70%. For comparison bank quality loans recover around 90-95% This is pre-costs. The mode of the distribution is weighted toward a higher recovery but with a large fat tail all the way down to 0-10% recoveries. In fact 0-10% recoveries are more common that 10-20% and 20-30% recoveries.
The quality of loans is best indicated by the yield the borrower pays, not the yield the lender receives or some forecasted LTV or LGDV. The yield tells you everything about the risk. P2P isn't some form of magic by which you get superior risk-adjusted returns to other asset classes. Markets are not always totally efficient but they are relatively efficient. Lendy's borrowers were paying effective blended yields (including upfront and exit fees) of anywhere between 16% to 30%. That's 3 to 4 times the yield of senior unsecured corporate junk debt. So you should be expecting horrble default rates and poor recoveries ... which is what we got.
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zlb
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Post by zlb on Sept 16, 2019 12:54:21 GMT
r00lish67 . I'm not sure where the seet spot is. In most asset classes, the best risk-adjusted returns occur toward the lower end of the return scale; as risk rises eventually the return flattens out and you are taking more risk for no marginal return. The problem, is that at the lower end of the risk scale, the outright return often isn't very attractive. The way to solve that is to leverage the returns of those lower risk assets. This is what banks do. The problem is that leverage makes you path dependent on the asset price vs funding. So it's not a free lunch. dan1 . You're absolutely correct that there are edge cases. This, however, is exactly what we see in practice with most platforms. They launch with a limited number of good loans at high rates, originating from exactly the edge cases you are pointing out. It's when the platform tries to scale that up that the problems arise. There aren't enough good borrowers with specific reasons why they can't access conventional, cheaper finance. This was most obvious with the biggest platform of them all, LendingClub in the US. As they went towards their IPO, they tried to scale up their lending to enhance the share price and borrower quality collapsed. FC did exactly the same 'dash for trash' in the run up to their IPO. And with Lendy it wasn't the boat loans that caused the losses ... So the 'edge cases' dry up in all circumstances (this is apparent, but generally unspoken of) - yet platforms continue to draw in lenders, and continue to operate without the initial flow of edge cases, leading to a ponzi-like lender behaviours in order for the lender to reduce losses. What if (some?) platforms were also to close doors to borrowers until new edge cases became apparent? Or is it that the platforms don't recognise that the edge cases do actually diminish and that not all borrowers are of equal character? Surely none of them will be able to operate if they have high defaults?
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bugs4me
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Post by bugs4me on Sept 16, 2019 21:47:05 GMT
So the 'edge cases' dry up in all circumstances (this is apparent, but generally unspoken of) - yet platforms continue to draw in lenders, and continue to operate without the initial flow of edge cases, leading to a ponzi-like lender behaviours in order for the lender to reduce losses. What if (some?) platforms were also to close doors to borrowers until new edge cases became apparent? Or is it that the platforms don't recognise that the edge cases do actually diminish and that not all borrowers are of equal character? Surely none of them will be able to operate if they have high defaults? Well maybe/possibly with some of the older P2P platforms although whether the edge ever existed with some of the newer platforms is a moot point. Carrying out some basic DD on the new entrants leaves a great deal to be desired regarding directors track records. Many of them hold numerous directorships and have several failed ventures under their belt. Are they really going to be that diligent regarding the quality of prospective borrowers. There’s absolutely nothing to stop an existing platform from ceasing to accept new borrowers but it will of course have a direct impact upon their income. No doubt this would be different if it was their own funds at stake but it’s not of course. Hence the reputation of many platforms is under severe stress which naturally has a knock on effect towards other platforms. ‘Defaults’ - oh that word again. Many a loan should have been defaulted ages ago but whilst that can is kicked down that road - to infinity and beyond - then it massages the stats conveniently. Plus of course the platform can claim to still be ‘chasing’ the borrower for the arrears. A great deal of it is all false of course as the borrower has long gone bankrupt, the PG has been proven to be worthless or maybe they have emigrated to the moon. But the charade continues when all lenders require is a conclusion and reality. Of course though the reality cannot be disclosed to lenders as it may jeopardise recovery efforts - what a joke - I think not. As an aside, once the deal flow eventually slows down sufficiently or ceases totally, there is nothing to stop the platform director(s) from appointing administrators to sort out the mess whilst riding happily into the sunset. And those can kicked loans well.......
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