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Post by Ace on Jan 26, 2024 16:32:38 GMT
I came across this recent letter from the FCA regarding their expectations for loan-based P2P platforms. My general impression of the FCA is that they have been very far from competent in their duty to regulate P2P and provide adequate protection for investors. However, this letter does seem to indicate that they are beginning to try to close the stable door. It seems that they are getting tougher on checking that platforms have sufficient funds put aside to pay for a platform winddown. I noticed that Kuflink's most recent accounts showed that they have set aside £900k in a segregated account for this purpose, which has increased from £800k the year before. So, it seems that this has probably been a requirement for some time now. I don't know whether £900k would be sufficient for a complete winddown, but it should go a long way on a fairly straightforward platform at the lower end of the risk scale. I'd be interested to know if any other platforms declare the size of their winddown fund. This got me thinking about whether such a fund would be likely to be anywhere near adequate on the higher risk platforms. ABLrate sprang to mind. Despite being both an investor and an equity holder in ABLrate, I'm unaware if they had such a fund. If they did, then it clearly wasn't close to being adequate to deal with the multiple problems they had across many interconnected loans, as they have now entered administration due to funds being exhausted. My takeaway from this is that lower risk platforms might be even lower risk than I thought if they have a reasonable winddown fund, but higher risk platforms might be even higher risk because any winddown fund would likely be quickly exhausted due to the added complexity and junior charge positions. This might be unfair on higher risk platforms where security charges have been correctly perfected. Thoughts?
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eeyore
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Post by eeyore on Jan 26, 2024 19:54:42 GMT
Without transparency of P2P platforms, we can only speculate!
We need FCA to document exactly what rules & regulations are being imposed upon the platforms and then each and every platform revealing how those rules and regulations are being complied with. It is in each individual platform's interests to show just how they meet (or exceed) best practice, because that will give the better ones a competitive advantage. The FCA wouldn't need as much effort in checking compliance if P2P lenders were continuously monitoring the platforms.
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iRobot
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Post by iRobot on Jan 26, 2024 20:41:33 GMT
An interesting read, Ace - thank you. Couple of initial thoughts. First is my disdain for the continued arms-length approach the FCA takes on their regulation of what is, in their words, a 'high-risk investment'. (I'm still wanting to put an 'extremely' in there! ) To wit: Why are they settling for a ' Yeah, we did that. Definitely. Honest guv', when they could insist that funds are deposited in an escrow account, or similarly controlled? To coin my favourite line from House MD: " Everybody lies." The second relates to your Kuflink observation (£900k set aside), and Ablrate's apparent shortfall in that area or, indeed, the provision held (or not) by any platform. When it gets to the point that a platform's owner/s realise/s the writing is on the wall, just how tempting is it to syphon funds away from the business for use 'elsewhere'. I think I'm correct in saying (and apologise unreservedly if I am wrong) that directors of both CollateralUK and Lendy were caught illicitly removing funds from the business. Hypothetically, Kuflink - and all due apologies to the folk at Kuflink for using them as an example - but Kuflink could have £9M instead £900K in a 'segregated account' and that would be seemingly wonderful - unless times got too hard, temptation proved too great and the funds were reallocated elsewhere. Either used operationally to KTLO, or simply spirited away into the night. At which point, whether £900K or £9M - it matters not. Specifically on Kuflink, a review of their Wind Down Plan suggests they have a time horizon of two years. I'm not familiar with Kuflink's loan book, but being witness to other 'winding down' events (aka 'administrations') suggest that two years may be optimistic, particularly for the rump of the loan book, presuming there would be some defaulted loan to manage. For example, FundingSecure's administration has entered its' fifth year. CollateralUK is almost in its sixth year and Lendy is approaching its' fifth. That said, I don't want to in any way suggest Kuflink is - or ever will be - another FS / COL / Ly!! Thirdly, and to their slight credit, the FCA highlighted 'concentration risk'; ie: where a platform has made - or is proposing to make - multiple loans to the same party (even if held in separate legal entities). Disappointingly, it doesn't appear to go so far as to mandate the disclosure of linked entities. Although, I might have missed that, or that detail may be written out in COBS or similar. Lastly, the letter mentions 'Consumer Duty' and how platforms need to spell out to Joe/Josephine Public the nature and extent of all risks. I think there's two sides to that particular coin. I think the FCA needs to do a better job on spelling out its' own role with regard to 'Consumer Duty'. It's been cited that some investors in failed P2P platforms only invested because there was an FCA approval given to the platform. (Personally, I doubt the that is strictly true for all those that claim it, but... ) That investors felt FCA approval provided any form of guarantee suggests to me that there is a general misunderstanding of what the FCA can feasibly do in its' day-to-day regulation of the P2P industry. Undoubtedly the FCA could do more. Arguably, it should do more; although it would need to be funded and I suspect the cost - if paid for directly by P2P platforms - would likely kill off the P2P industry. That anyone might regard the FCA as a proactive, boots-on-the-ground, protective force, shielding the unwary from the unscrupulous and the incompetent, is laughable when it is realised, in real terms, just how ineffectual the FCA are. The FCA are not fit for purpose and their ongoing immunity from legal censure serves to perpetuate their ineptitude. Make it possible to sue the FCA for damages when it proven they have failed their legal and mandated obligations and the public might start seeing some proper regulatory protection. Until then, the FCA need to do a better job of educating the public as to exactly what can be expected from them. Shouldn't take long.
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p2pfan
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Post by p2pfan on Jan 27, 2024 0:41:52 GMT
£900k and two years is not even close to covering the costs for a platform with the huge number of complex loans that Kuflink has, with a large number of them already in default for over a year, for wind-down.
As pointed out above, we see from other similar P2P platforms that it takes at least five years and many millions of pounds for a platform to be wound-down.
The £900k figure is a red herring. It is merely used to fool people in thinking there is ample protection in case things go wrong but the amount required in reality would be massively more. I'd be willing to bet a pretty penny on that, but don't have much money to do so because of my astronomical losses on the administrations of such lending platforms.
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Post by filip on Jan 27, 2024 8:56:23 GMT
Hi Ace,
Since we received a few nervous emails yesterday in relation to your post, I thought I provide some thoughts here directly.
The security position (senior or junior) is largely irrelevant, but what matters is the size and complexity of the loan book. Generally, it takes more time and is more expensive to resolve say a half-completed multimillion development versus a small second charge bridging loan.
Another important consideration is treatment of interest i.e. if interest is retained or rolled.
With retained interest, the platform has a steady income to cover its expenses, whilst with rolled interest, the platform only receives revenues when a loan is redeemed, and therefore the platform has to rely on income from other sources to cover its expenses. This can be significant if a platform has a large proportion of non-performing loans that are not paying any interest and therefore no revenues earned by the platform (and as the platform cannot originate new loans and earn any revenues from new originations).
The issue is much more complex and detailed than this, but the above is some main considerations.
Filip
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ilmoro
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Post by ilmoro on Jan 27, 2024 10:42:44 GMT
£900k and two years is not even close to covering the costs for a platform with the huge number of complex loans that Kuflink has, with a large number of them already in default for over a year, for wind-down. As pointed out above, we see from other similar P2P platforms that it takes at least five years and many millions of pounds for a platform to be wound-down. The £900k figure is a red herring. It is merely used to fool people in thinking there is ample protection in case things go wrong but the amount required in reality would be massively more. I'd be willing to bet a pretty penny on that, but don't have much money to do so because of my astronomical losses on the administrations of such lending platforms. Its not £900k, its £900k + any normal income from performing loans. The £900k should only come into play when the latter is less than the platform operating costs. Of course, platform operating costs should diminish as well. The key point is when the winddown is triggered ... it should never get to the point where insolvency is necessary. Thats what the regulator should be ensuring with regular monitoring of platform health. Platforms offering development loans should be required to include in a winddown plan evidence of how they will be able to ensure funding of in-course developments to completion. Two years is clearly a nonsense if loans have terms longer than 12 months The FCA is clearly failing in this area, because it has not made the below a rule, merely guidance. It wouldnt need to send out letters to remind platforms of its expectations. s
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Post by overthehill on Jan 27, 2024 15:44:06 GMT
I'm not sure we can use 5 years as a yardstick for a typical administration or wind down of an honest P2P platform, Growth Street was less than a year from memory. The group of failed platforms including Fundingsecure that are taking years and years were riddled with lack of transparency, incompetence, misdemeanour, dishonesty and fraud with regard to their loans.
Arguably, we're going to find out which camp Ablrate is in using the same measure !
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keitha
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Post by keitha on Jan 29, 2024 11:53:47 GMT
£900k and two years is not even close to covering the costs for a platform with the huge number of complex loans that Kuflink has, with a large number of them already in default for over a year, for wind-down. As pointed out above, we see from other similar P2P platforms that it takes at least five years and many millions of pounds for a platform to be wound-down. The £900k figure is a red herring. It is merely used to fool people in thinking there is ample protection in case things go wrong but the amount required in reality would be massively more. I'd be willing to bet a pretty penny on that, but don't have much money to do so because of my astronomical losses on the administrations of such lending platforms. Agreed, even just running the IT systems with necessary security updates etc would be costly, that's without admin staff, office space, etc etc. And it goes nowhere towards addressing the sheer volume of emails , FB posts, tweets etc that would be generated by investors. and presumably if P2P lender goes into wind down as opposed to liquidation or administration then it remains responsible for redundancy payments etc. If you were one of the staff retained to run down you want assurances about your own redundancy payments at the end, indeed in the last year or more staff would be thinking of their futures so would be looking for alternative employment. Seriously I wouldn't trust a promise of a £20,000 bonus if I stayed in post till wind down completed
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p2pfan
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Post by p2pfan on Jan 29, 2024 12:12:43 GMT
I'm not sure we can use 5 years as a yardstick for a typical administration or wind down of an honest P2P platform, Growth Street was less than a year from memory. The group of failed platforms including Fundingsecure that are taking years and years were riddled with lack of transparency, incompetence, misdemeanour, dishonesty and fraud with regard to their loans.
Arguably, we're going to find out which camp Ablrate is in using the same measure !
Even without fraud etc., I can say with iron-clad certainly that Ablrate will take well over five years and cost many millions of pounds. In terms of a relatively recent P2P closure, TheHouseCrowd mostly had relatively straightforward loans without the exception of two or three, all within the same niche. Despite that, it has now been three years into the Administration without me and most lenders having received a penny of our money back. There is no end in sight and it will be at least another two years for matters to be wrapped up. And many millions of pounds charged in administration fees. Ablrate is more complicated, with very messy loans and uncooperative/crooked borrowers, almost all in default. The loans were structured differently and are in all kinds of areas ranging from a gym to a property development to energy generation to car sales. There is no chance whatsoever it will take less than a few years. The administrators will make the simplest matter seem like climbing Everest and anything any of us could do in two weeks they will say it takes six months to maximise their fees. We should make our assertions based on what has happened previously in similar scenarios rather than blind faith that matters will pan out well.
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