benaj
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Post by benaj on Feb 1, 2019 10:37:31 GMT
A lot of firms are authorised by the FCA. Some even has 100% track record of paying interest on time, some investment even have asset backed security. However, we have seen some cases gone into administration. There are news might not calm investors nerve and it seems it is not easy to fully understand the risk of each platform.
Is there a way to foresee the issues before they go into administration?
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Post by df on Feb 1, 2019 22:12:51 GMT
A lot of firms are authorised by the FCA. Some even has 100% track record of paying interest on time, some investment even have asset backed security. However, we have seen some cases gone into administration. There are news might not calm investors nerve and it seems it is not easy to fully understand the risk of each platform. Is there a way to foresee the issues before they go into administration? I don't think so. Even BM invested in two Col loans not long before Col collapsed. That's why diversification is very important.
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Post by mrclondon on Feb 2, 2019 1:37:04 GMT
A very good question benaj , but one I fear that has no answer beyond "trust your own gut instinct."
The point that df made regarding BM/COL is very perceptive. I along with a few others sensed something was "not quite right" about col and limited our investments with col as a result, but BM apparently missed the warning signs. (I'm not talking specifically about FCA permissions here, more the broader picture of how col were conducting business).
Broadly I think the issue is that there is too much trust and not enough verification in the p2p sector. That statement primarily refers to platforms being too trusting of borrowers/brokers/valuers, but also applies to the likes of BM who have the ability to validate platforms in a way that us mere mortals can't.
Most p2p platforms originated from small startups (as opposed to formed as an offshoot of an existing financial services business). Perhaps it was naive to think that it was possible for them to remain small customer focussed businesses able to generate enough income to cover overheads and support a handful of staff. Certainly most have gone for a dash for growth that has increased platform risk not reduced it. Big is not necessarily best.
In terms of quantative risk assessment things to consider are platforms that don't perfect security at CH/LR (several platforms), platforms that consider keeping lenders in the dark as to borrower/asset identity is key to their success (probably a majority of platforms), platforms that don't carry out regular monitoring/reporting of loans during their life (most platforms), platforms that don't seem to have a consistent recoveries policy for distressed loans, aka can kicking (most platforms), platforms that grow ever bigger but so do their annual losses (several platforms), platforms that don't have a consistent throughput of loans from which to generate revenue (several platforms).
The problem is there are very few platforms that don't fall into two or more of those risk categories.
And then there are the curved balls ... the group of forum members who are currently seeking to force a platform into administration because they believe an administrator would do a better job at loan recovery than the platform, the borrower who is suing a platform and its lenders, the EU based platforms that may face brexit disruption (either through loss of passporting, or the FCA having the freedom to force some of them out of the UK market).
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Godanubis
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Anubis is known as the god of death and is the oldest and most popular of ancient Egyptian deities.
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Post by Godanubis on Feb 2, 2019 3:43:05 GMT
The only thing I can work out having been on p2p for a long time is that the longer I’ve been on a platform, the worse it seems to be. Sadly, I see no reason to expect that it’ll “be different this time” on any new or recent platform. Perhaps, the best bet is to go in heavy with any new platform but sell up and leave within the first two years whilst it’s still liquid. Too much fuss for me though. I think Welendus might be the exception. It is however tiny which is good for the smaller investors wanting to dip a toe in the muddy P2P waters. Despite what has been said Collateral did not collapse it was put into administration for breaking FCA rules. The loans it held were of reasonable quality. Were it not for records not being available this would have been resolved by now. The only safe bet is to diversify massive restricting losses to tiny percentages covered by the higher returns in well performing majority of individual loans . None of the current operating platforms show an overall loss so diversification over platforms and loans will show a profit there are very few other revenue streams that can match that.
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pom
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Post by pom on Feb 2, 2019 9:43:51 GMT
The point that df made regarding BM/COL is very perceptive. I along with a few others sensed something was "not quite right" about col and limited our investments with col as a result, but BM apparently missed the warning signs. (I'm not talking specifically about FCA permissions here, more the broader picture of how col were conducting business). In fairness we don't know that, because we don't know if BM were investing similar amounts in COL compared to other platforms, for all we know they could also have been limiting investment (although yeah I'd like to think that if I were investing other peoples money I'd have a rather more binary view). Despite what has been said Collateral did not collapse it was put into administration for breaking FCA rules. The loans it held were of reasonable quality. Were it not for records not being available this would have been resolved by now. And why were records not available? I wouldn't assume anything at this point, I'm afraid I wouldn't be at all surprised if the loans weren't as good as you think. If they led us to believe they had interim permissions and an application for full was ongoing, then it seems likely to me that sooner or later something even stinkier would have become apparent and the wheels would have fallen off. Mind you the administration timing sucked from my perspective - if it hadn't happened then at worst I'd only have a couple of stuck loans by now as I was on my way out (because my gut had never been entirely happy with them, so I only invested a limited amount and stopped as soon as liquidity started drying up).So in that respect for me it would likely have been resolved by now! So yeah, diversify loads there's plenty to choose from (I must have tried well over 30 by now, and there's only 6 I really had concerns about), trust no-one (more than you can afford to), and if in doubt, don't.
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Godanubis
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Anubis is known as the god of death and is the oldest and most popular of ancient Egyptian deities.
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Post by Godanubis on Feb 2, 2019 10:48:08 GMT
The point that df made regarding BM/COL is very perceptive. I along with a few others sensed something was "not quite right" about col and limited our investments with col as a result, but BM apparently missed the warning signs. (I'm not talking specifically about FCA permissions here, more the broader picture of how col were conducting business). In fairness we don't know that, because we don't know if BM were investing similar amounts in COL compared to other platforms, for all we know they could also have been limiting investment (although yeah I'd like to think that if I were investing other peoples money I'd have a rather more binary view). Despite what has been said Collateral did not collapse it was put into administration for breaking FCA rules. The loans it held were of reasonable quality. Were it not for records not being available this would have been resolved by now. And why were records not available? I wouldn't assume anything at this point, I'm afraid I wouldn't be at all surprised if the loans weren't as good as you think. If they led us to believe they had interim permissions and an application for full was ongoing, then it seems likely to me that sooner or later something even stinkier would have become apparent and the wheels would have fallen off. Mind you the administration timing sucked from my perspective - if it hadn't happened then at worst I'd only have a couple of stuck loans by now as I was on my way out (because my gut had never been entirely happy with them, so I only invested a limited amount and stopped as soon as liquidity started drying up).So in that respect for me it would likely have been resolved by now! So yeah, diversify loads there's plenty to choose from (I must have tried well over 30 by now, and there's only 6 I really had concerns about), trust no-one (more than you can afford to), and if in doubt, don't. If you see from those who have kept a keen eye on these things a number of the loans have fresh charges in CH showing probable refinancing. You are perfectly correct you cannot stress enough don’t trust anyone. This applies to most things there is never a downside to extreme caution. Slow steady growth is better than the quick fix.
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Post by mrclondon on Feb 3, 2019 18:58:57 GMT
[...] the EU based platforms that may face brexit disruption (either through loss of passporting, or the FCA having the freedom to force some of them out of the UK market). When I typed that yesterday, I was unaware that the application by Mintos (an unregulated Latvian company) for FCA authorisation in the UK had been refused ... it's worth a read of the FCA's decision notice linked to in this thread so see the importance that the FCA attaches to where the key management of a UK subsidiary have to be based ( ... in the UK).
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registerme
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Post by registerme on Feb 3, 2019 19:54:04 GMT
[...] the EU based platforms that may face brexit disruption (either through loss of passporting, or the FCA having the freedom to force some of them out of the UK market). When I typed that yesterday, I was unaware that the application by Mintos (an unregulated Latvian company) for FCA authorisation in the UK had been refused ... it's worth a read of the FCA's decision notice linked to in this thread so see the importance that the FCA attaches to where the key management of a UK subsidiary have to be based ( ... in the UK). Equally they say this:- The Authority is not satisfied that the Firm has been able to demonstrate that it has the appropriate resources to implement its proposed business model in the UK. In particular, a number of its policies and procedures are too high level and lack coherence, and it is unclear whether the Firm has the capability to implement them in a manner that will enable it to comply with its regulatory obligations. Accordingly, the Authority is not satisfied that the Firm is sufficiently ready, willing and organised to undertake its proposed business compliantly. There's more than one UK based p2p platform that would struggle to meet such requirements.
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Post by stevefindlay on Feb 3, 2019 21:31:32 GMT
To offer our view generally, and to make some observations on COL:
Generally
We have now reviewed 125+ lending partners and P2P platforms, meeting 100+ face to face (we only meet with those face to face that pass our initial review). We invest through 32 lending partners, the vast majority are specialist property bridge lenders, mostly outside of P2P, which provide refurbishment and redevelopment capital. Although we do work with some P2P lenders still.
We have a detailed assessment, but if I was to summarise the top 3 criteria, we are looking for lending partners that:
1. Have experience and expertise; and are able to source good opportunities; ideally not just through the broker community (and not from aggressive marketing or offering low rates).
2. Are well aligned: invest alongside and have their own capital at risk (as we do ourselves)
3. Provide good risk-adjusted opportunities - (i) the rate of return is commensurate with the risk; and not significantly different to what the borrower is paying (ii) LTV is sensible (and valuation is credible, and based on current realisable value) (iii) typically first lien (iv) clear exit.
Once approved, we start small, and may slowly consider increasing our exposure. We invest a maximum of 15% with any one provider (our current portfolio has a maximum of about 10%) and have no more than 1% against any one borrower. We have invested in 1 in 3 loans from our approved lending partners, seeking to stay at the more conservative end of the market.
We have invested £50M across 2,000+ property loans, and have lost a total of £65k to date (<15bp) - and lost nothing on our Property lending; whilst clients have earned £2M+ of interest and an average net return of 6% pa in each year since 2015. Every month we have delivered a positive return, without exception. We are pleased with this performance.
COL
Much has been written about COL. At the time of our review, they met the criteria set out above for some of their property loans - and we 'dipped our toe' into a few. Our total exposure to COL is c.2% of our book, and (pursuant to some announcements about our service later this month) we expect the impact to be negligible-to-nil for our clients from our exposure to COL.
Obviously, we were very disappointed at the COL situation. But I think it is important to point out that the situation arose because of a particular set of regulatory circumstances; not because of demise in the loans we were exposed to. It would be very difficult to see how these circumstances could repeat with any other of our approved lending partners (I don't see a systemic risk for us).
Looking ahead
We expect choppy waters in P2P lending land - there are still a handful of good operators - but we expect more loan books to go the way of LfSS; FC etc. So we definitely suggest staying well diversified (particularly if you can't conduct your own platform-level DD), being cautious, and being vigilant.
Back in 2015/16 we were chastised somewhat by some for not offering the 12% 'returns' available elsewhere. Hopefully, our cautious approach is now being more widely accepted as a good one - we still consider 5-6% pa net to be achievable in 2019, a good risk-adjusted return - and we look forward to continuing to work hard for the benefit of investors in this asset class.
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dApps
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Post by dApps on Feb 3, 2019 21:46:12 GMT
To offer our view generally, and to make some observations on COL: <snip> COLMuch has been written about COL. At the time of our review, they met the criteria set out above for some of their property loans - and we 'dipped our toe' into a few. Our total exposure to COL is c.2% of our book, and (pursuant to some announcements about our service later this month) we expect the impact to be negligible-to-nil for our clients from our exposure to COL. Obviously, we were very disappointed at the COL situation. But I think it is important to point out that the situation arose because of a particular set of regulatory circumstances; not because of demise in the loans we were exposed to. It would be very difficult to see how these circumstances could repeat with any other of our approved lending partners (I don't see a systemic risk for us).
<snip? Always nice to have platform contributions Steve, but I'd like to ask a specific question (ok, two ): At the time of the review, did BM ask the FCA to confirm COL's regulatory status? And, if so, how did the FCA reply? Thx.
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Post by stevefindlay on Feb 4, 2019 7:53:49 GMT
To offer our view generally, and to make some observations on COL: <snip> COLMuch has been written about COL. At the time of our review, they met the criteria set out above for some of their property loans - and we 'dipped our toe' into a few. Our total exposure to COL is c.2% of our book, and (pursuant to some announcements about our service later this month) we expect the impact to be negligible-to-nil for our clients from our exposure to COL. Obviously, we were very disappointed at the COL situation. But I think it is important to point out that the situation arose because of a particular set of regulatory circumstances; not because of demise in the loans we were exposed to. It would be very difficult to see how these circumstances could repeat with any other of our approved lending partners (I don't see a systemic risk for us).
<snip? Always nice to have platform contributions Steve, but I'd like to ask a specific question (ok, two ): At the time of the review, did BM ask the FCA to confirm COL's regulatory status? And, if so, how did the FCA reply? Thx. We conducted desktop research which confirmed the status that the COL directors had given us: namely, they were operating under Interim Permissions (as were many other platforms at that time). If you ask the FCA directly - as we have done with some other platforms - they will not comment on individual operators, and will only point to already public information - eg the FCA register.
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ozboy
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Mine's a Large One! (Snigger, snigger .......)
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Post by ozboy on Feb 4, 2019 9:38:19 GMT
Always nice to have platform contributions Steve, but I'd like to ask a specific question (ok, two ): At the time of the review, did BM ask the FCA to confirm COL's regulatory status? And, if so, how did the FCA reply? Thx. We conducted desktop research which confirmed the status that the COL directors had given us: namely, they were operating under Interim Permissions (as we're many other platforms at that time).If you ask the FCA directly - as we have done with some other platforms - they will not comment on individual operators, and will only point to already public information - eg the FCA register. I, like numerous Collateral Lenders, am VERY interested in what excuse/s The FCA will eventually concoct so they can absolve themselves completely from the fact that they stated incorrect information on their website and mislead Investors.
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dApps
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Post by dApps on Feb 4, 2019 13:12:25 GMT
We conducted desktop research which confirmed the status that the COL directors had given us: namely, they were operating under Interim Permissions (as we're many other platforms at that time).If you ask the FCA directly - as we have done with some other platforms - they will not comment on individual operators, and will only point to already public information - eg the FCA register. I, like numerous Collateral Lenders, am VERY interested in what excuse/s The FCA will eventually concoct so they can absolve themselves completely from the fact that they stated incorrect information on their website and mislead Investors. stevefindlay: thank you. A useful insight. ozboy: they don't always succeed in absolving themselves, as the ' FCA pays out' thread demonstrates.
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