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Post by chris on Aug 4, 2015 7:11:23 GMT
6 times today now i've had this problem, including at work, on home computer and on iPhone.... Do you have Interest Earned on your dashboard?
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bg
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Post by bg on Aug 4, 2015 7:28:54 GMT
6 times today now i've had this problem, including at work, on home computer and on iPhone.... Do you have Interest Earned on your dashboard? No, current accrued interest, average rate, total investment, total lent. I get this error message before i get to the security question. Has happened twice already this morning...
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Post by chris on Aug 4, 2015 7:30:03 GMT
Do you have Interest Earned on your dashboard? No, current accrued interest, average rate, total investment, total lent. I get this error message before i get to the security question. Has happened twice already this morning... Okay, will get all shouty in the office.
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sl75
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Post by sl75 on Aug 4, 2015 15:52:09 GMT
To be fair it's the provision fund that benefits from any uplift up until we have 5% coverage across all investments. Yes, but the point @john334 seemed to be making was that at RateSetter, any surplus that accumulates in the Provision Fund is eventually distributed to lenders, but AC's surplus seems to go into their own back pockets. This gives AC an incentive to take more risks with their provision fund, as AC directly benefit from the upside (if defaults are lower than expected), but do not suffer from the downside losses if defaults are higher than expected (as it is then lenders who get a return below the capped rate, or in an extreme case, possibly an actual loss). Alternatively, it could be spun positively - AC have a greater incentive to ensure collections perform well, as their interests are aligned with those of non-protected lenders.
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Post by chris on Aug 4, 2015 16:57:02 GMT
To be fair it's the provision fund that benefits from any uplift up until we have 5% coverage across all investments. Yes, but the point @john334 seemed to be making was that at RateSetter, any surplus that accumulates in the Provision Fund is eventually distributed to lenders, but AC's surplus seems to go into their own back pockets. This gives AC an incentive to take more risks with their provision fund, as AC directly benefit from the upside (if defaults are lower than expected), but do not suffer from the downside losses if defaults are higher than expected (as it is then lenders who get a return below the capped rate, or in an extreme case, possibly an actual loss). Alternatively, it could be spun positively - AC have a greater incentive to ensure collections perform well, as their interests are aligned with those of non-protected lenders. I certainly see the motivations as being along the lines of the positive spin, in that we're incentivised to ensure the loan book performs as expected or better, as we financially benefit should it do so and have no upside if it doesn't (in addition to all the negatives in terms of reputation). I have a lot of time and respect for RateSetter and what they've achieved, they're certainly one of the good guys in the industry, but wouldn't the argument apply that as they have no financial interest in the provision fund then they have no financial interest in being conservative and managing it properly beyond reputational risk (which also applies to us). Quite the contrary it's in their interest to take more risks to lend more funds to more risky lenders, paying a higher fee, that they can then keep. From a compliance point of view it would also be interesting how they're avoiding being a collective investment scheme, plus if the fund sees any loss at all then that's technically a lender loss which doesn't square with their advertising. I'm obviously the techie so take all the above with a pinch of salt, and I haven't a clue how RateSetter actually view their management of the provision fund, but I honestly can't see why we're conflicted when others aren't seen as being so.
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sl75
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Post by sl75 on Aug 4, 2015 19:00:20 GMT
..., but I honestly can't see why we're conflicted when others aren't seen as being so. The conflict would be between actions to minimise the chance that the PF will ever be insolvent, and actions that increase the uncertainty of funding of the PF, giving a higher chance that the PF will be able to declare a surplus, but also a higher chance that the PF will become insolvent. For example, if all provision funds for all products are pooled, the chance that the PF will ever be insolved is minimised. However, if a platform structures it as separate independent provision funds, this increases the chance that they'll be able to declare a surplus on at least one of them is increase (especially when one becomes closed to new investment), but also the chance that one of the funds will become insolvent is also increased. Similarly, a platform deciding whether to approve an unusually large loan which could single-handedly wipe out the whole balance of the provision fund (but which will make a very large contribution to the provision fund) may have different priorities if it gets to keep the profits but doesn't suffer a direct loss. There seems something of a conflict when the largest loan that may be (attempted to be) protected by the PF is 20% of funds, but the PF only has cover for 5% - I don't think RateSetter, for example, has approved any single loan that could single-handedly wipe out the provision fund, yet AC boasts of having the largest ever recovery of a P2P loan - an amount far larger than the balance of their PF, and which could thus NOT have been covered by it had the default occurred under PF conditions.
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Post by pepperpot on Aug 4, 2015 19:12:48 GMT
..., but I honestly can't see why we're conflicted when others aren't seen as being so. The conflict would be between actions to minimise the chance that the PF will ever be insolvent, and actions that increase the uncertainty of funding of the PF, giving a higher chance that the PF will be able to declare a surplus, but also a higher chance that the PF will become insolvent. For example, if all provision funds for all products are pooled, the chance that the PF will ever be insolved is minimised. However, if a platform structures it as separate independent provision funds, this increases the chance that they'll be able to declare a surplus on at least one of them is increase (especially when one becomes closed to new investment), but also the chance that one of the funds will become insolvent is also increased. Similarly, a platform deciding whether to approve an unusually large loan which could single-handedly wipe out the whole balance of the provision fund (but which will make a very large contribution to the provision fund) may have different priorities if it gets to keep the profits but doesn't suffer a direct loss. There seems something of a conflict when the largest loan that may be (attempted to be) protected by the PF is 20% of funds, but the PF only has cover for 5% - I don't think RateSetter, for example, has approved any single loan that could single-handedly wipe out the provision fund, yet AC boasts of having the largest ever recovery of a P2P loan - an amount far larger than the balance of their PF, and which could thus NOT have been covered by it had the default occurred under PF conditions. The PF would only need to cover the portion that is taken up by GBBA and any large loan will be taken up proportionately with others so can only ever be 20% of GBBA investments (if same as GEIA?).
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jonah
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Post by jonah on Aug 4, 2015 19:12:39 GMT
sl75 is as usual far more articulate than I but my only addition is that as I understand it, RSs fund continues to grow and hasn't got a hard x% cap on like GBBA does.
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Post by chris on Aug 4, 2015 19:43:57 GMT
sl75 is as usual far more articulate than I but my only addition is that as I understand it, RSs fund continues to grow and hasn't got a hard x% cap on like GBBA does. It only grows if there are no defaults / payouts. What's their current coverage as a percentage of the loan book? It's certainly less than 5%.
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Post by chris on Aug 4, 2015 19:46:46 GMT
..., but I honestly can't see why we're conflicted when others aren't seen as being so. The conflict would be between actions to minimise the chance that the PF will ever be insolvent, and actions that increase the uncertainty of funding of the PF, giving a higher chance that the PF will be able to declare a surplus, but also a higher chance that the PF will become insolvent. For example, if all provision funds for all products are pooled, the chance that the PF will ever be insolved is minimised. However, if a platform structures it as separate independent provision funds, this increases the chance that they'll be able to declare a surplus on at least one of them is increase (especially when one becomes closed to new investment), but also the chance that one of the funds will become insolvent is also increased. Similarly, a platform deciding whether to approve an unusually large loan which could single-handedly wipe out the whole balance of the provision fund (but which will make a very large contribution to the provision fund) may have different priorities if it gets to keep the profits but doesn't suffer a direct loss. There seems something of a conflict when the largest loan that may be (attempted to be) protected by the PF is 20% of funds, but the PF only has cover for 5% - I don't think RateSetter, for example, has approved any single loan that could single-handedly wipe out the provision fund, yet AC boasts of having the largest ever recovery of a P2P loan - an amount far larger than the balance of their PF, and which could thus NOT have been covered by it had the default occurred under PF conditions. On top of the PF we still have the asset security, where RS only have the PF, so chances of total losses should be reduced. The financial types in the business have done plenty of modelling and believe the 5% level is right. Also whilst the diversification algorithm has an upper limit of 20%, it strives for a balanced book with all loans around the same level. New loans can only be over exposed if there's a glut of loans in which to invest in and a build up of demand. This is very unlikely in the GBBA as it covers somewhere around 50% of all loans coming on to the platform at the moment, so new loans are likely to be bought into at the rate funds are deposited whilst the diversification algorithm then balances that across the loan book. It's not in our interests for the PF to run out of money as the reputational damage keeps that in check, and I still think we're better off aiming to run a surplus across the board than crashing one or more of the PFs. Not quite following the logic there.
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jonah
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Post by jonah on Aug 4, 2015 19:57:55 GMT
sl75 is as usual far more articulate than I but my only addition is that as I understand it, RSs fund continues to grow and hasn't got a hard x% cap on like GBBA does. It only grows if there are no defaults / payouts. What's their current coverage as a percentage of the loan book? It's certainly less than 5%. According to a back of the envelope calculation on their public site figures, about 3.6%. So I take you point chris One of these days I will learn to think a little more.
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niceguy37
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Post by niceguy37 on Aug 5, 2015 8:32:57 GMT
If the GBBA is a success and grows steadily (and I see no reason why it shouldn't follow the success of the GEIA), then I would guess AC might have to add more seed money to the provision fund, rather than declaring a surplus from being over the 5% limit. IIRC RateSetter have had to add funds to their protection fund to provide for growth.
Assuming an average return of 10% from loans, this gives GEIA and GBBA 3% surplus interest per year. Without growth or defaults you'd expect it to take one year and 8 months to reach 5%. So with growth, and some level of fund payout for defaults/late payments etc it will probably be several years before AC can claw back their original funds they used to seed the fund.
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